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Economists have long held two opposing views on the merits of the stock market and the asso-
ciated corporate form of organization. On the one hand the stock market permits the substantial
production risks of society to be diversiﬁed among many investors: this view underlies the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) which forms the basis for much of the modern theory of ﬁnance. On
the other hand, the traditional view of classical economists, revived in modern times by Berle and
Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the ensuing agency-cost literature, has emphasized
the negative eﬀect on incentives of the separation of ownership and control implied by the corporate
form of organization. The object of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for reconciling
these two perspectives, by showing circumstances under which the stock market can provide an
optimal trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁcial eﬀect of risk sharing and the distortive eﬀect on incentives.
We argue furthermore that, when capital markets have become suﬃciently developed by the in-
troduction of a rich array of associated options markets, incentive structures can be created using
these markets which compensate for the reduced ownership shares of top executives, so that agency
costs can be eliminated, permitting a Pareto optimum to be achieved by the combined trading of
equity and options.
To capture the dual role of capital markets in aﬀecting risk sharing and incentives, we consider
a simple general equilibrium model of a ﬁnance economy with production. In the spirit of Knight
(1921) we model the ﬁrm as an entity arising from the organizational ability, foresight and initiative
of an entrepreneur. The activity of a ﬁrm consists in combining entrepreneurial eﬀort and physical
input (the value of capital and non-managerial labor) at an initial date: this gives rise to a random
proﬁt stream at the next date. In addition to entrepreneurs there is another class of agents which
we call investors: they have initial wealth at date 0 but no productive opportunities. In the
spirit of the principal-agent literature, we assume that the eﬀort of entrepreneurs is not observable
and that the risks to which ﬁrms are exposed are suﬃciently complex to make the writing and
enforcement of contracts contingent on states unfeasible (states of nature are unveriﬁable). Under
these conditions, markets for channeling capital from investors to ﬁrms and for sharing risks must
either be non-contingent or based on the realized outputs of ﬁrms. This class of ﬁnancial markets
includes the bond and equity markets, which have a long tradition, and the much more recently
introduced markets for options on equity contracts.1 We consider two scenarios, corresponding
roughly with the diﬀerent stages in the evolution of the capital markets: in the ﬁrst the available
1While the New York Stock Exchange was established in 1772, the ﬁrst organized market for trading options is of
very recent origin — the Chicago Board Options Exchange was opened in 1973.
1securities are limited in their ability to deal simultaneously with risk sharing and incentives; in the
second the structure is very rich — more precisely it satisﬁes the condition which (in Section 4) is
called complete spanning with redundancy.2 In both settings the market structure is assumed to
include both (default-free) debt and equity.
Thus entrepreneurs can obtain funds for ﬁnancing their capital investment by drawing on their
own initial wealth, by selling shares of their ﬁrms or by issuing debt; they can diversify their
risks by buying shares of other ﬁrms and, when possible, by buying or selling options on their
equity and that of other ﬁrms. Since arrangements for ﬁnancing typically have to be made before
production can take place, we assume that the trades on the ﬁnancial markets are made before the
entrepreneurs choose the level of eﬀort to invest in their ﬁrms. Under these circumstances trades on
the ﬁnancial markets will inﬂuence the eﬀort that entrepreneurs invest in their ﬁrms. To take the
simplest example, if the markets consist solely of equity and bonds, and an entrepreneur ﬁnances
his venture by selling most of the shares of his ﬁrm, he will not have much incentive to invest eﬀort,
since most of the payoﬀ from his eﬀort goes directly to outside shareholders.
Since investors know that the eﬀort that an entrepreneur invests in running his ﬁrm (and
hence the proﬁt that it generates) is conditioned by his prior ﬁnancing decision, they will go to
considerable length to acquire the pertinent information regarding these ﬁnancial decisions. In
Section 2 we argue that most of the information required by investors to deduce the pattern
of behavior of entrepreneurs is at least approximately available in US capital markets without
prohibitive costs. We thus propose a concept of equilibrium based on two ideas. First, investors
acquire the information about the ﬁnancial decisions of the entrepreneurs and use this information
to estimate the eﬀort that entrepreneurs will exert. Second, rational entrepreneurs take this fact into
account: this is formalized by the concept of price perceptions. To decide whether an investment-
ﬁnancing plan is optimal, an entrepreneur needs to evaluate what would happen if he were to
change this plan: his price perceptions describe how he perceives that the price of his equity (and
associated options) would react to any such change of plan. The price perceptions are assumed
to be rational (i.e. entrepreneurs think that investors will correctly deduce from their investment-
ﬁnancing decision what their eﬀort and the associated output of their ﬁrm will be) and competitive
(entrepreneurs cannot aﬀect the way the market prices risks i.e. the state prices implicit in the
equilibrium prices of the securities). Putting these ideas together leads to the concept of a stock
2In this paper, since ﬁnancial markets have to provide not only risk sharing but also the appropriate incentives,
the distinction between the two scenarios does not reduce to the standard one between incomplete and complete
markets: for example a debt and equity structure which is complete in the usual sense of spanning all possible income
streams, does not satisfy the condition of complete spanning with redundancy.
2market equilibrium with rational, competitive price perceptions (an RCPP equilibrium).
The ﬁnancing decision of an entrepreneur aﬀects both his incentives to invest eﬀort in his ﬁrm
and his ability to diversify risks. Creating greater incentives can typically only be made at the cost
of creating greater risks. Such a trade-oﬀ between incentives and risk sharing has been extensively
studied in the principal-agent literature.3 In the setting that we consider however, there is no
principal who directly designs a contract to induce entrepreneurs to behave in an optimal way:
whatever incentive schemes there are must somehow be created by the markets. It is thus natural
to ask whether the capital markets can create payoﬀ functions for the agents which lead to a socially
optimal balance between incentives and risk sharing.
This question is answered in two steps. We ﬁrst consider market structures which are limited in
their ability to share risks and provide incentives and examine if an RCPP equilibrium leads to the
best allocation which can be obtained with such a market structure. The appropriate concept for
studying this question is the concept of constrained Pareto optimality in which a benevolent planner
replaces the agents as the single Olympian decision-maker choosing the variables — capital inputs
and portfolios of ﬁnancial securities — which agents would otherwise choose on the markets. We
show that an RCPP equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal. The non-observability of the actions
of the entrepreneurs creates an externality, since entrepreneurs choose their eﬀort levels in their
own interests without taking into account the interests of outside shareholders. This externality
is explicitly taken into account by the planner when choosing the ﬁnancial variables of the agents.
The crucial ingredient in an RCPP equilibrium, which leads each entrepreneur to make the same
choice as the planner, is the rational price perception function: each entrepreneur realizes that the
market value of his ﬁrm depends on the eﬀort that investors expect from him, and in seeking to
maximize the market value of his ﬁrm the entrepreneur is induced to align his interests with those
of the outside shareholders of his ﬁrm. In short the perception function leads each entrepreneur to
internalize the externality involved in his decision.
Thus, for any ﬁnancial structure, an RCPP equilibrium functions well, exploiting optimally the
existing ﬁnancial markets. This leads naturally to the second question: is it possible to obtain
ﬁrst-best optimality with a suﬃciently rich market structure? As noted by Ross (1976), introduc-
ing options on existing equity contracts is the lowest transaction-cost method for increasing the
spanning opportunities of the capital markets. This observation has been strikingly conﬁrmed by
the subsequent developments on US capital markets: the number and volume of trades in such
securities has grown dramatically in the last twenty years. Along with greatly reﬁned hedging
3See e.g. Ross (1973), Holmstr˝ om (1979), Rogerson (1985), Jewitt (1988), and Kreps (1990, Chapter 16).
3opportunities, options provide a powerful and convenient substitute for direct ownership as a way
of aligning the interests of top managers of a ﬁrm with those of outside shareholders. In this latter
role, in the last ten years options have come to represent almost 40 % of the compensation of CEOs
in the largest companies in the US (see Murphy (1998)). In the last section of the paper we study
if theory can justify practice, i.e. if a rich menu of options permits both optimal risk sharing and
optimal incentives to be achieved. The result is essentially positive, modulo technical diﬃculties.
Options are extremely eﬃcient instruments for increasing spanning and providing managers with
incentives, but they have the unfortunate technical drawback of introducing non-convexities into
the model. In the absence of options, the eﬀort-choice problem of an entrepreneur is convex: when
options are introduced the problem becomes non-convex and has a complicated structure because
of the changes of regime induced by options going in and out of the money when eﬀort is changed.
Replacing the eﬀort-choice problem by its ﬁrst-order condition leads to what we call in Section 4
a weak-RCPP equilibrium. Under the condition of complete spanning with redundancy — which
is satisﬁed when there are options with striking prices between the possible values of the ﬁrms’
outputs — every weak-RCPP equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Analysis of examples suggests that
with appropriate striking prices for the options, weak-RCPP equilibria are RCPP equilibria.4
The idea that ﬁnancial decisions of agents transmit information about their characteristics or
actions which are not directly observable or knowable by the market, has been extensively explored
in the ﬁnance literature. Concepts of equilibrium based on this idea and the idea of rational
expectations have been used in many partial equilibrium models: for adverse selection in the
signaling models of Ross (1977), and Leland and Pyle (1977), and the subsequent literature (see
Harris and Raviv (1992) for a survey); for problems of moral hazard by Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Grossman and Hart (1982), and Brander and Spencer (1989). These concepts of equilibrium are
close in spirit to an RCPP equilibrium. This paper diﬀers from these latter contributions in that it
provides a framework in which the risk-sharing function of ﬁnancial markets and their disciplining
role in attenuating the agency costs of ﬁrms can be studied simultaneously.
More recently, some authors (Lisboa (1998), Kocherlakota (1998)) have studied general equi-
librium models with moral hazard, under the assumption of observability of trades. Since these
models are generalizations of the principal-agent model with ﬁxed outcomes, the moral hazard and
risk-sharing problems cannot be simultaneously fully resolved and only second-best outcomes can
4In the standard model studied in the principal-agent literature it is assumed that the outcomes are ﬁxed and
that eﬀort inﬂuences the probability of these outcomes. Suﬃcient conditions for the agent’s eﬀort-choice problem to
be convex at the second-best optimum have been given by Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988). At the moment we
have not found similar assumptions which ensure that the ﬁrst-order conditions are suﬃcient for characterizing the
optimal eﬀort, for the case where eﬀort inﬂuences outcomes and options are used for creating incentives.
4be obtained. Bisin-Gottardi (1997) have also studied a class of general equilibrium models with
asymmetric information: they exhibit a variety of restrictions on agents’ trades which make it pos-
sible to establish existence of an equilibrium, a problem which we examine only brieﬂy in Section
4.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of a stock-market economy
with moral hazard and introduces the concept of an RCPP equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the
constrained Pareto optimality of an RCPP equilibrium. Section 4 studies the conditions under
which a ﬁrst-best optimum can be obtained.
2. Equilibrium with Rational Competitive Price Perceptions
Consider a two-period one-good economy with production in which investment of both capital
and eﬀort at date 0 is required to generate output at date 1, the output at date 1 being uncertain.
There are two types of agents in the economy, entrepreneurs and investors: I1  = ∅ is the set of
entrepreneurs, I2  = ∅ the set of investors and I = I1 ∪I 2 is the set of all agents, which is assumed
to be ﬁnite.5 Every agent i ∈Ihas an initial wealth ωi
0 at date 0. If agent i is an entrepreneur,
then by investing capital κi ∈ |R+ (an amount of the good (income)) and eﬀort ei ∈ |R+ at date 0
he can obtain the uncertain stream of income
F i(κi,e i)=( Fi
1(κi,e i),...,Fi
S(κi,e i))
at date 1, where S = {1,...,S} is the set of states of nature describing the uncertainty and
F i : |R2
+ −→ |RS
+ is a concave, diﬀerentiable, non-decreasing function, with F i(κi,0) = F i(0,e i)=0.
Investors are agents who do not undertake productive ventures, so if i ∈I 2,t h e nF i(κi,e i) ≡ 0.
Each agent has a utility function Ui : |RS+1
+ ×|R+ −→ |R, where Ui(xi,e i) is the utility associated
with the consumption stream xi =( xi
0,x i
1,...,x i
S)a n dt h ee ﬀ o r tl e v e lei. The utility function is







5Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters: the same letter in roman denotes the cardinality of the set, e.g. I =
{1,...,I}. Vectors, matrices and vector-valued functions are written in boldface.
6The separability in date 0 consumption x
i
0 signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the deﬁnition of an RCPP equilibrium in which
the choice of date 0 consumption (and the ﬁnancial variables) of an entrepreneur is based on a computation by
backward induction of his choice of eﬀort and consumption at date 1. The separability in eﬀort is not an essential
simplifying assumption and can be dropped without aﬀecting any results: it is adopted to make the cost-beneﬁt
analysis of an entrepreneur’s eﬀort decision more intuitive.
5where the functions ui
0,u i
1 are diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, increasing, and ci is diﬀerentiable,
convex, increasing, with ci(0) = 0.
To ensure that the technology of each entrepreneur i is suﬃciently productive to make it worth-
while to operate, we assume that, as soon as entrepreneur i invests some positive eﬀort in his ﬁrm,
the marginal productivity of capital at zero is inﬁnite. More precisely we assume that for all i ∈I 1
there is a smooth path ei :[ 0 ,1] −→ |R+ with ei(0) = 0 and ei (t) > 0 such that
lim
t→0








= ∞, for some s ∈S .




0 > 0, there





1 + F i(κi,e i)) − ci(ei) >u i(xi
0)+ui(xi
1)
so that even if there were no market to ﬁnance the capital investment, entrepreneur i would choose
to produce. To bound the economy we assume that, for any positive level of capital input, the
marginal cost of eﬀort eventually exceeds its marginal product
∂Fi(κi,e i)
∂ei → 0, and ci (ei) →∞ when ei →∞ ,i ∈I 1
This implies that, for a given level of capital, the eﬀort chosen by entrepreneur i will always remain
bounded.
Market Structure. The analysis of the paper rests on two basic assumptions. The ﬁrst is that
eﬀort is not observable, so that contracts cannot be written contingent on the eﬀort invested by
entrepreneurs in their ﬁrms. This would not create a problem without the second assumption:
states of nature are not veriﬁable, so that the enforcement of contracts contingent on states is not
feasible. For if the uncertain contingencies to which businesses are exposed were suﬃciently simple
7Let ∆U
i denote the diﬀerence in entrepreneur i’s utility between investing (κ
i,e
i(κ
i)) and investing (0,0), where
e
i(·) is the function just deﬁned, and let κ
i ≤ min {x
i
































































where the right side of the inequality is positive for κ
i > 0 suﬃciently small.
6to make the writing and enforcement of state contingent contracts enforceable, then, without loss of
generality, it could be assumed that there is a complete set of Arrow securities: in such an economy
an eﬃcient allocation can be obtained by letting each entrepreneur be the sole proprietor of his ﬁrm
and using Arrow securities to share the productive risks (see Section 4). But the only contracts
which are assumed to be enforceable are either non-contingent contracts such as debt, or contracts
contingent on the realized outputs of ﬁrms, namely equity contracts and options on equity.
Trading contracts contingent on realized output when there is no separate market for “eﬀort”
is liable however to lead to ineﬃciencies. For typically entrepreneurs need funds to ﬁnance their
ﬁrms. If they only have access to borrowing (debt), and if there are penalties for default, then
they will have to restrict the amount they borrow for fear of bad contingencies, and in addition
will be exposed to rather risky leveraged positions. The traditional remedy lies in introducing the
possibility of ﬁnancing by issuing equity: this additional source of funds, permits entrepreneurs to
share the risks involved in their productive activity with investors, and opens up the possibility for
all agents to diversify their risks. But selling ownership shares of his ﬁrm has negative incentive
eﬀects on the entrepreneur, since any increment to eﬀort is no longer rewarded by the full value
of its marginal product. Debt and equity contracts however constitute only the ﬁrst stage in the
development of ﬁnancial markets to meet the ﬁnancing needs of ﬁrms; when ﬁnancial markets
become more sophisticated, a second stage consists in the introduction and systematic use of
derivative securities. Such securities serve two roles: they increase the risk-sharing possibilities of
agents (the span of the markets) and provide instruments for creating incentives for managers of
ﬁrms. Holding an option which is worthless unless the proﬁt of the ﬁrm exceeds the striking price
of the option provides a strong incentive for a manager to exert the extra eﬀort needed to assure
that the proﬁt stream is likely to surpass this level. Thus the use of options can potentially restore
some, or even all, of the incentives of entrepreneurs lost in reducing their equity shares to ﬁnance
their ﬁrms.
The ﬁnancial contracts which the agents in the economy can trade are thus taken to be: ﬁrst,
the default-free bond with (date 0) price q0 and payoﬀ stream 1 =( 1 ,...,1) at date 1; second for
each ﬁrm i ∈I 1, its equity contract with price qi
y and date 1 payoﬀ stream yi =( yi
1,...,yi
S); ﬁnally
for each ﬁrm a family of derivative securities on its equity, consisting of call options with diﬀerent
striking prices. Note that there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to this class of
options, since the payoﬀ of a put option can always be reconstructed from a suitable portfolio of
the equity, the bond and a call option with the same striking price. Moreover with a ﬁnite state
space, put and call options generate the maximum dimensional subspace that can be spanned by
7securities whose dividend streams are non-linear functions of the payoﬀ of the underlying equity
(Ross [1976, Theorem 2]). Thus let J i ⊂ |N denote the index set for the call options on the equity
of ﬁrm i,a n dl e tτi =( τi
j)j∈J i denote the vector of associated striking prices, with τi ∈ |RJi
+ .T h e
call option (i,j)—t h ejth option of ﬁrm i —h a st h ep r i c eqi




j,S) across the states at date 1 given by
Ri





s(κi,e i) denotes the output of ﬁrm i in state s. When it is important to stress that
the choice of (κi,e i) inﬂuences the payoﬀ of the equity and thus of the option, we use the notation
Ri
j,s(κi,e i)= m a x{Fi
s(κi,e i) − τi
j,0},s ∈S
Let Ri (or Ri(κi,e i)) denote the S × Ji matrix of payoﬀs of the Ji options of ﬁrm i, Ri
s the row
vector of payoﬀs of the Ji options on ﬁrm i in state s and Ri
j the column vector of payoﬀs of option
j across the states. Let J = ∪i∈I1J i denote the set of all options and let τ =( τi)i∈I1 denote
the associated striking prices. The economy with characteristics U =( Ui)i∈I, ω0 =( ωi
0)i∈I,
F =( F i)i∈I1 for the agents, and with a market structure composed of the riskless bond, the
equity contracts of the I1 ﬁrms, and the set of options J with striking prices τ, will be denoted
E(U,ω0,F,τ). In such an economy, we let qy =( qi
y)i∈I1 denote the vector of equity prices, qi
c the
vector of prices of the Ji call options of ﬁrm i, qi =( qi
y,qi
c) the vector of prices which are inﬂuenced
by the actions of entrepreneur i,a n dq =( q0,(qi)i∈I) the vector of all security prices.
Budget Constraints. To simplify the analysis we assume that the penalty for default for indi-
vidual agents and for bankruptcy8 by ﬁrms is inﬁnite so that the personal debt of an entrepreneur
and the debt incurred by his ﬁrm are both default-free debt. With no default and no bankruptcy
there is no loss of generality in assuming that the entrepreneur is personally responsible for the
debt of his ﬁrm.
At date 0 entrepreneur i decides on the amount of capital κi to invest in his ﬁrm, on the amount
to borrow ξi
0 (if ξi
0 > 0, lend if ξi
0 < 0), and on the share (1−θi
i) of his ﬁrm to sell. He also purchases
shares θi
k of other ﬁrms k  = i,a sw e l la sa m o u n t sξi
k,j of the options of these ﬁrms (j ∈Jk,k = i)
to diversify his risks. The purchase of a portfolio of options (ξi
i,j)j∈J i on his own equity contract
8When the set of options on ﬁrm i is suﬃciently rich, the no-bankruptcy assumption is not restrictive, since with
the possibility of bankruptcy the equity contract becomes a call option and its debt contract a put option on ﬁrm i’s
proﬁt. The payoﬀs of these contracts can be reconstructed with the existing securities. The notation of this paper is
much simpliﬁed by not introducing explicitly the possibility of bankruptcy, and thus taking the payoﬀ of an equity
contract to be the vector (y
i
s),s∈S.
8serves as an incentive device to “bond” his personal interest to those of the outside shareholders
of his ﬁrm (as we shall see shortly). Let θi =( θi
k)k∈I1, denote the equity portfolio, ξi
k =( ξi
k,j)j∈J k
the portfolio of options of ﬁrm k and ξi =( ξi
0,(ξi
k)k∈I1) the portfolio of all securities in zero net
supply (bond and options) held by agent i. If entrepreneur i anticipates the production (yk)o f
other entrepreneurs, then a choice of the ﬁnancial variables (κi,θi,ξi), in conjunction with a choice
of eﬀort ei, leads to a vector of consumption xi =( xi
0,x i
1,...,x i




































If agent i is an investor, then the budget equations are the same with κi =0 ,e i =0 ,F i = 0,qi
y =
qi
j = 0, so that the terms related to his own “ﬁrm” are just dummy variables.9
It is clear from equations (2) that the date 1 reward of an entrepreneur for his eﬀort depends
on his choice of ﬁnancial variables (κi,θi,ξi). This captures the idea that the capital structure
of a ﬁrm (in particular the inside equity and options held by the manager, and the ﬁrm’s debt)
aﬀects the performance of its management. Since ﬁnancing arrangements must be in place before
a ﬁrm can become operational, we assume that the choice of eﬀort ei by an entrepreneur is made
after the ﬁnancial decisions (κi,θi,ξi) have been determined. To make this sequential structure of
decision making explicit, it is useful to introduce the following timing of the agents’ decisions. Date
0 is divided into two subperiods, 01,02. In subperiod 01 entrepreneurs use the ﬁnancial markets to
obtain the capital required to set up their ﬁrms and diversify their risks: in the second subperiod
02, after the investment and ﬁnancing decisions have been made, ﬁrms become “operational” and
entrepreneurs decide on the appropriate eﬀort to invest in running their ﬁrms. At date 1 “nature”
chooses a state of the world s ∈S: production takes place and proﬁt is realized.
Optimal Eﬀort. After entrepreneur i has chosen his ﬁnancial variables (κi,θi,ξi) in subperiod
01 (in a way that we study later), in subperiod 02 he chooses the eﬀort level ei which maximizes
ui
1(xi
1) − ci(ei), where xi
1 =( xi
1,...,x i
S) is the date 1 consumption stream given by (2). En-
trepreneur i’s ﬁnancial variables are of two kinds: inside variables (those internal to the ﬁrm)
which directly aﬀect the payoﬀ (reward) of the entrepreneur from his eﬀort, and the outside vari-
ables (external to the ﬁrm) which determine the income that agent i gets independently of his
eﬀort. (κi,θi
i,ξi
i) are the inside ﬁnancial variables which determine his inside income (the last two
9When we need uniﬁed notation for both types of agents, entrepreneurs and investors, we adopt the convention
that for k ∈I 2, θ
i
k =0i fi  = k, θ
k
k =1a n dJ
k = ∅.
9terms in (2)), while (ξi
0,(θi
k,ξi











namely the ﬁrst three terms in (2). Deﬁne the eﬀort correspondence of entrepreneur i
˜ ei(mi,κ i,θi
i,ξi






   
 xi
1 = mi + F i(κi,e i)θi




Since we have assumed that the marginal productivity of eﬀort tends to zero when eﬀort tends to
inﬁnity while its marginal cost tends to inﬁnity, the problem (E) has a maximum for some ﬁnite
value of ei and the correspondence ˜ ei is well-deﬁned on the domain Di ⊂ |RS
+×|R×|RJ×|RJi
consisting
of the variables (mi,κ i,θi
i,(ξi





j(κi,e i) ∈ |RS
++ for
some ei > 0. In the special case where there are no options (J i = ∅), the assumptions of strict
concavity of ui
1, convexity of ci and concavity of F i ensure that the solution to (E) is unique, so
that ˜ ei is a function on Di.W h e nJ i  = ∅, the payoﬀs of the options introduce a non-convexity into
the constraint set in E, and the solution of the maximum problem may not be unique: in this case
˜ ei is a correspondence deﬁned on Di.
RCPP Equilibrium. Consider an investor10 who is thinking of buying either the equity or
options of ﬁrm i. To anticipate what the ﬁrm’s proﬁt will be, the investor needs to anticipate
the entrepreneur’s inputs (κi,e i). In this model we assume that the capital input κi is observable,
while the eﬀort ei is not. However, as we have seen, ei can be deduced if the entrepreneur’s
characteristics (ui
1,F i,c i) and his ﬁnancial variables, or more precisely his outside income mi and
the inside ﬁnancial variables (κi,θi
i,ξi
i), are known: in the analysis that follows we assume that
investors do indeed have access to this information and hence can deduce the eﬀort ei that the
entrepreneur will invest in his ﬁrm.
In practice there is an important distinction between accessibility of information regarding the
inside ﬁnancial variables (κi,θi
i,ξi
i) and information regarding the outside wealth mi and character-
istics (ui
1,F i,c i) of a ﬁrm’s manager. Disclosure rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission
require that proxy statements of publicly traded ﬁrms contain information regarding capital projects
of the ﬁrm, as well as the equity and options holdings of the top management. Thus the assumption
10In the discussion that follows we use the term “investor” in an extended sense: it refers not only to agents in I2
but also to any agent who buys securities for which he is not in an insider position. Thus for example entrepreneur
k buying shares of ﬁrm i with k  = i is considered as an investor on ﬁrm i’s equity market.
10that inside variables are known by investors conforms with the regulations of capital markets in
the US.
More detailed information regarding the characteristics of the ﬁrm and its manager are less
directly accessible, and it is essentially the job of security analysts to gain access to this type of
information. While this information may not be available with the precision required by the model,
analysts will however in the course of scrutinizing the earnings prospects of the ﬁrms they follow,
acquire a good knowledge of the characteristics of the ﬁrms and their top management. Analysts
who have followed the careers of top executives are likely to have a good estimate of the magnitude
of their personal wealth and hence can impute at least the orders of magnitude of their outside
incomes. Past performance gives information on their ability — which in the model is included in
the function F i — and their motivation and ability to take risks — in the model, the functions ui
1
and ci. The information collected by analysts spreads to investors through advisory services and
the recommendations given by large brokerage companies. The assumption that the characteristics
and ﬁnancial trades of the entrepreneurs are known by all agents is thus the theoretical limit of a
situation in which both the rules of disclosure and the activity of professionals in ﬁnancial services
result in a large amount of information being available to investors in the market.
If entrepreneurs’ ﬁnancial trades are known to investors, if investors make optimal use of this
information to anticipate the outputs of ﬁrms, and in this way come to decide on the prices they are
prepared to pay for the equity and options of the ﬁrms, then it seems reasonable to suppose that
entrepreneurs will come to understand this. Hence our second assumption regarding anticipations:
entrepreneurs are aware that investors will use their ﬁnancial decisions as “signals” of the eﬀort
that they will exert in their ﬁrms. The next step is to incorporate these two assumptions — namely
that (1) investors use the available information (the ﬁnancial variables) to correctly anticipate the
ﬁrms’ outputs, (2) entrepreneurs understand this — into a concept of equilibrium.
The description of an equilibrium thus consists of two parts. The ﬁrst is the standard part which
enumerates the actions of the agents and the prices of the securities; the second part describes the
entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the way their ﬁnancial decisions aﬀect the price that the “market”








j)j∈J i) denote the price perception of entrepreneur i where
˜ Qi
β : |R+ × |RI × |RJ −→ |R+,β= y or j, j ∈Ji
is the price that entrepreneur i expects for security β (his equity, or an option on his equity) if he




1) denote the price perceptions of all
entrepreneurs.
11It is useful to deﬁne the following date 1 payoﬀ matrices associated with the diﬀerent securities in
the economy. Let V 0 =( 1 ,...,1)T be the payoﬀ of the riskless bond and, for a vector y =( yi)i∈I1,
let V i(y)=[ yi,Ri(yi)] denote the S × (1 + Ji) matrix of payoﬀs of the securities of ﬁrm i.
V (y)=[ V 0,V 1(y),...,V I1(y)] denotes the S × [1 + (1 + J1)+...+( 1+JI1)] payoﬀ matrix of
all the securities and V −i(y)=[ V 0,...,V i−1(y), V i+1(y)...V I1(y)] is the payoﬀ matrix of all
securities other than those of ﬁrm i. The associated subspaces of |RS generated by the columns of
the above matrices are denoted by V0,Vi(y),V(y)a n dV−i(y) respectively: we call Vi(y)t h eﬁrm
i-subspace and V(y)t h emarketed subspace at y.
A vector of prices q which prices the basic securities in the model (the columns of the matrix
V (y)) leads to a valuation of every income stream in the marketed subspace vq : V(y) → |R deﬁned
by





where z =( ξ0,θ,(ξi)i∈I1) is any portfolio such that m = V (y)z. The valuation vq is well-deﬁned if
the vector of prices q does not oﬀer any arbitrage opportunities — a property which is equivalent to
the existence of a strictly positive vector π ∈ |RS such that πV (y)=q (see Magill-Quinzii [1996a,
section 9]). Since we have assumed that there are investors (I2  = ∅) who can take advantage of
arbitrage opportunities, any vector of equilibrium prices for the securities must be arbitrage free,
and thus admit an associated vector of state prices.
Deﬁnition 1. A ﬁnancial market equilibrium with price perceptions ˜ Q for the economy E(U,ω0,F,τ)
is a triple
((¯ x, ¯ y,¯ e, ¯ κ, ¯ θ,¯ ξ), ¯ q ; ˜ Q)
consisting of actions, prices and price perceptions such that
(i) for each agent i ∈Ithe action (¯ xi, ¯ ei, ¯ κi, ¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i) maximizes Ui(xi,e i) among consumption-
eﬀort streams such that
xi
0 = ωi
0 − v¯ q(mi)+˜ Q
i
y(κi,θi,ξi)(1 − θi





1 = mi + F i(κi,e i)θi
i + Ri(κi,e i)ξi
i




k + ¯ R
kξi
k)
(ii) ¯ qi = ˜ Q
i






k =1 ,k∈I 1 (iv)
 
i∈I ξi




k = 0,k∈I 1.
12Note that this deﬁnition introduces some obvious notation: ¯ yk = F k(¯ κk, ¯ ek) is the equilibrium
output of ﬁrm k and ¯ R
k
j is the payoﬀ of the jth option on ﬁrm k when its output is ¯ yk.
In an equilibrium with price perceptions, each entrepreneur takes the production plans and the
prices of the securities of other entrepreneurs’ ﬁrms as given, correctly anticipating the eﬀort they
invest in their ﬁrms. He chooses his own actions, anticipating that those which are observable (his
ﬁnancial decisions) will inﬂuence the prices of his securities in the way indicated by the function
˜ Q
i
(κi,θi,ξi). By (ii), the price perceptions are consistent with the observed equilibrium prices ¯ qi
for each ﬁrm, and by (iii)-(v) the security markets clear.
Without more precise assumptions on the price perceptions ˜ Q
i
, the deﬁnition of equilibrium
given so far only incorporates the ﬁrst assumption that we discussed above — namely that investors
have correct expectations — but it does not yet explicitly incorporate the second — namely that
entrepreneurs are fully aware of this fact. To form his anticipations ˜ Q
i
, entrepreneur i needs to
predict:
(a) the output of his ﬁrm that investors expect if they observe (κi,θi,ξi)
(b) how the market will price this expected output and the associated options of his ﬁrm.
For part (a) we use the assumption that entrepreneur i knows that investors will deduce from
the observation of (κi,θi,ξi) what his likely eﬀort ei ∈ ˜ ei will be, and hence what the likely
output F i(κi,e i) of his ﬁrm will be. For part (b) we assume that the entrepreneur is, like an
investor, a price-taker in the market for risky income streams. This price-taking assumption for
price perceptions can be formalized as follows. If m ∈ |RS is a potential income stream in V(¯ y),
then its anticipated value is v¯ q(m)=
 
s∈S πsms,w h e r eπ ∈ |RS
++ is any vector of state prices
satisfying πV (¯ y)=¯ q. As long as the entrepreneur envisions alternative production plans lying in
the marketed subspace V(¯ y), he does not perceive the possibility of aﬀecting the state prices implicit
in the equilibrium prices ¯ q. While the price-taking assumption leads to a well-deﬁned valuation of
income streams in the marketed subspace, it does not extend in any natural way to income streams
outside of the marketed subspace: for if m / ∈V (¯ y), the value
 
s∈S πsms can change when the
vector of state prices satisfying πV (¯ y)=¯ q is changed, so that the valuation of the stream m is no
longer well-deﬁned.11 To stay within a framework that permits the competitive assumption to be
retained without raising conceptual diﬃculties, we introduce the assumption of partial spanning.
Deﬁnition 2. We say that there is partial spanning (PS) at ¯ y if for all i ∈I 1, for all (κi,e i) ∈ |R2
+
11This problem has been extensively discussed in the literature on equilibrium in a production economy with
incomplete markets (see Ekern-Wilson [1974], Radner [1974], Dr` eze [1974], Grossman-Hart [1979], or the exposition
in Magill-Quinzii [1996a, chapter 6].)
13and yi = F i(κi,e), the ﬁrm i-subspace Vi(y) is contained in the marketed subspace at ¯ y, i.e.
Vi(y) ⊂V(¯ y).
The partial spanning assumption is classical in the literature (see references in footnote 10): it
means that a ﬁrm cannot create a “new security”, i.e. an income stream which is not in the existing
marketed subspace V(¯ y), by changing its production plan. With partial spanning the market prices
of the securities are suﬃcient signals to value all possible alternative production plans of any ﬁrm
and its associated options.
Deﬁnition 3. A ﬁnancial market equilibrium with rational competitive price perceptions (RCPP)
is an equilibrium ((¯ x, ¯ y,¯ e, ¯ κ, ¯ θ,¯ ξ), ¯ q ; ˜ Q) with price perceptions such that:
(i) PS holds at ¯ y
(ii) for each i ∈I 1 the price perceptions are given by
˜ Q
i
y(κi,θi,ξi)=¯ πFi(κi, ˆ ei), ˜ Qi
j(κi,θi,ξi)=¯ πRi
j(κi, ˆ ei),j∈Ji
for any ¯ π ∈ |RS
++ such that ¯ πV (¯ y)=¯ q and ˆ ei ∈ ˜ ei(κi,θi,ξi) which maximizes
¯ πFi(κi,e i)(1 − ¯ θi
i) − ¯ πRi(κi,e i)¯ ξ
i
i
Note that we use the notation ˜ ei(κi,θi,ξi) instead of ˜ ei(mi,κ i,θi
i,ξi
i), since mi is a function of
the ﬁnancial variables (θi
k,ξi
k,k  = i) given by (3). To check if his equilibrium ﬁnancial decisions
(¯ κi, ¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i) are optimal, entrepreneur i considers alternative decisions (κi,θi,ξi), recognizing that
investors are rational and will deduce from (κi,θi,ξi) what his associated optimal eﬀort will be
— namely the solution of the optimal eﬀort problem (E) if it is unique, or if it is multivalued,
the solution which yields the highest date 0 income for entrepreneur i (recall that ui
1(xi
1) − ci(ei)
has the same value for each of the solutions). This is the “rational” part of his anticipations. To
evaluate the prices ˜ Q
i
(κi,θi,ξi) that he would get for the alternative output or that he would pay
for the options on his ﬁrm, he uses any state price vector ¯ π compatible with the equilibrium vector
of security prices ¯ q. This is the “competitive” part of his expectations, which requires that PS hold
at equilibrium.
PS is automatically satisﬁed if the ﬁnancial markets are complete at equilibrium (rank V (¯ y)=
S), but it can also be satisﬁed when the markets are incomplete as shown by the following examples.
Example 1. The ﬁnancial markets are simple: they consist solely of the bond and equity markets,
so that J i = ∅ for all i ∈I 1. The production function of each ﬁrm has a factor structure:
14F i(κi,e i)=fi(κi,e i)ηi where fi : |R2
+ −→ |R is a concave increasing function and ηi ∈ |RS
+ is a
ﬁxed vector, characterizing the risk structure of the ﬁrm. Then PS is satisﬁed if fi(¯ κi, ¯ ei) > 0f o r
all i ∈I 1. This case is studied in detail in Magill-Quinzii (1996b).
Example 2. The ﬁnancial securities consist of the riskless bond, equity and options on each ﬁrm.
Suppose the uncertainty (shocks) aﬀecting the production in the economy is decomposed into a
product of I1 spaces
S = S1 × ...×S I1 = {1,...,S1}×...×{ 1,...,SI1}
so that a state of nature is an I1 -triple s =( s1,...,s I1)w h e r esi is the shock experienced by
ﬁrm i. Then for any pair of states s =( s1,...,s I1) ∈S , ˆ s =( ˆ s1,...,ˆ sI1) ∈Swith si =ˆ si,
Fi
s(κi,e i)=Fi
ˆ s(κi,e i) for all (κi,e i) ∈ |R2
+. If the vector F i(¯ κi, ¯ ei) takes on Si diﬀerent values for
the Si individual states of ﬁrm i, and if there are options with striking prices in between the Si
diﬀerent values taken by the output of ﬁrm i,f o re a c hﬁ r mi ∈I 1, then PS is satisﬁed.
3. Constrained Optimality of RCPP
The concept of an RCPP equilibrium is a natural way of describing market behavior in a
production economy with moral hazard in which agents are informed. To get a feel for how natural
this concept is we turn to a study of its normative properties. At the ﬁrst stage of development,
when the contracts traded consist solely of the bond and the equity of ﬁrms, there is a clear trade-oﬀ
between incentives and risk sharing. Entrepreneurs who want to ﬁnance their investment without
incurring a large debt (which would put them in an in inordinately risky situation) can choose
to ﬁnance some of their investment by issuing equity, thus opening the way to risk sharing and
diversiﬁcation. But issuing equity means they no longer receive the full marginal beneﬁt of their
eﬀort, so their incentives to exert eﬀort are diminished. Do markets induce entrepreneurs to make
the optimal trade-oﬀ between incentives and risk sharing in their choice of debt and equity?
At a more mature stage of development, in addition to the bond and equity markets, options
on the ﬁrms’ proﬁts (equity) are introduced. Such contracts not only augment the opportunities
for risk sharing, but also permit the introduction of non-linear reward schedules for entrepreneurs:
non-linear schedules incorporate “high powered” incentives which can help to solve the moral-
hazard problem induced by the reduced equity shares of entrepreneurs. If the entrepreneur receives
a larger share of output when the ﬁrm’s realized output is high than when it is low, then he will
(typically) be induced to increase eﬀort, to increase the likelihood of a high realization of output.
15Such an incentive scheme can be obtained by adding options to his share of equity: but would an
entrepreneur choose to buy options to increase his incentives in this way, given that the income
stream received from his ﬁrm will tend to be more risky? In short, do market-induced choices
of bonds, equity and options by entrepreneurs and investors lead to the best possible use of these
instruments?
To answer this question we consider another way of arriving at an allocation where a “planner”
— rather than the agents — chooses the ﬁnancial variables, and examine if the planner could
obtain a better allocation (in the Pareto sense) than that achieved in a RCPP equilibrium. Such
a comparison only makes sense if the planner faces the same problem of unobservability of eﬀort
of the entrepreneurs and is restricted to the same opportunities for risk sharing as those available
to the agents with the system of ﬁnancial markets. In particular the planner cannot dictate eﬀort
levels to entrepreneurs — rather, these eﬀort levels are chosen optimally by the entrepreneurs who
take the reward structure given by the debt-equity-option choice of the planner and the eﬀort levels
of other agents (and hence their outputs) as given.
Deﬁnition 4. An allocation (x,e) ∈ |R
(S+1)I
+ × |RI
+ is constrained feasible if there exist inputs and
portfolios (κ,θ,ξ) ∈ |RI




0 = 0 (ii)
 
i∈I θi














1 = mi + F i(κi,e i)θi
i + Ri(κi,e i)ξi
i,i ∈I
(vi) mi = 1ξi
0 +
 
k =i(F k(κk,e k)θi
k + Rk(κk,e k)ξi
k),i ∈I
(vii) ei ∈ ˜ ei(mi,θi
i,ξi
i),i ∈I
An allocation (x,e)i sconstrained Pareto optimal (CPO), if it is constrained-feasible, and if there
does not exist any alternative constrained feasible allocation (ˆ x,ˆ e) such that Ui(ˆ xi, ˆ ei) ≥ Ui(xi,e i),
i ∈I, with strict inequality for at least one i.
(i)-(iii) are the feasibility constraints for the planner’s choice of ﬁnancial variables (θ,ξ). Con-
straint (iv) indicates that the planner does not need to respect a system of prices for the securities
and the associated date 0 budget constraint implied for each agent: it is in this sense that the
planner replaces the “market”. (v) and (vi) indicate that the planner’s choice of date 1 consump-
tion streams, and hence risk sharing, for the agents respects the existing structure of the ﬁnancial
securities. (vii) are the incentive constraints which reﬂect the fact that the choice of eﬀort is made
16by entrepreneur i (and not the planner), and is the one that is optimal given the ﬁnancial variables
attributed to him, and given the eﬀort levels of other agents (since agent i takes mi as given).
The following proposition shows that despite the fact that a planner chooses the ﬁnancial
variables (κ,θ,ξ) fully aware of their consequences for the choices of eﬀort by entrepreneurs and of
the eﬀect of each entrepreneur’s eﬀort on the consumption of other agents (the outside shareholders),
he cannot improve on an RCPP equilibrium allocation arising from the self-interested choices of
agents co-ordinated by the ﬁnancial markets, provided we invoke the following strengthening of the
partial spanning assumption.
Deﬁnition 5. We say that there is strong partial spanning (SPS) at ¯ y if for all (κ,e) ∈ |R2I1 and
y =( F k(κk,e k)k∈I1), V−i(y) ⊂V −i(¯ y) for all i ∈I 1.
SPS ensures that there is partial spanning for every subset of I1 − 1 ﬁrms. Note that even if
markets were complete, SPS would not automatically be satisﬁed. It holds if the securities based
on the outputs of any subset of I1−1 ﬁrms suﬃce to complete the markets, or if each ﬁrm spans its
own subspace, as in Examples 1 and 2. SPS implies PS: if ﬁrm i cannot create an income stream
which lies outside V−k(¯ y)f o rk  = i, it cannot create an income stream lying outside V(¯ y).
Proposition 1. (RCPP is CPO) If an RCPP equilibrium ((¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ e, ¯ κ, ¯ θ,¯ ξ), ¯ q ; ˜ Q) of the economy
E(U,ω0,F,τ) satisﬁes SPS at ¯ y,t h e n(¯ x,¯ e) is constrained Pareto optimal.
Proof. Suppose the equilibrium allocation (¯ x, ¯ y,¯ e, ¯ κ, ¯ θ,¯ ξ) is not CPO, then there exists a con-
strained feasible allocation (x,y,e,κ,θ,ξ) satisfying (i)-(vii), with y = F i(κi,e i)f o ri ∈I ,s u c h
that Ui(xi,e i) ≥ Ui(¯ xi, ¯ ei), for all i ∈I, with strict inequality for some i. Since SPS holds, agent i
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case, by (vii) in Deﬁnition 4, the eﬀort level ei would have been optimal. With the prices and




) would have led to a
date 0 consumption ˆ xi
0.S i n c e Ui(xi,e i) ≥ Ui(¯ xi, ¯ ei) ∀ i ∈I , with strict inequality for some i,i f
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0 < ˆ xi
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for all i ∈I , with strict inequality for some i. (Note that the RHS of the above inequality is ˆ xi
0.)
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which contradicts (iv) of Deﬁnition 4. Thus it is not possible for a planner to improve on an RCPP
equilibrium allocation.  
The choice of ﬁnancial variables (θ,ξ) creates a reward structure for each entrepreneur, namely






i,j max {yi − τi
j,0} + mi(y−i),i ∈I 1
where y =( yi,y−i),y i being the random output of the ﬁrm and y−i the random output of all other
ﬁrms. J =
 
i∈I1 J i determines the richness of the incentive structure over and above the basic
equity contracts. If J = ∅, the market and the planner are restricted to linear contracts, while if
J  = ∅ the admissible contracts are nonlinear (piecewise linear): the larger the sets J i,t h el a r g e r
the admissible class of piecewise linear functions.
18The CPO problem, which amounts to choosing optimally the investment, risk and incentive
structure for the economy, is a generalized principal-agent problem, in which the planner (the
principal) chooses the investment in each ﬁrm and the (constrained) optimal contract for each
entrepreneur and investor in the economy. When agents rationally anticipate in the way described
by an RCPP equilibrium, then Proposition 1 asserts that a system of markets is capable of solving
the principal-agent problem. The basic driving force for this optimality property of an RCPP
equilibrium is that the social eﬀect of each entrepreneur’s choice of capital and reward structure
— in particular the eﬀect on outside investors — is transmitted to the entrepreneur through the
rational price perceptions. A way of better understanding the forces which lead agents to optimally
co-ordinate their actions is to study the ﬁrst-order (i.e. the marginal) conditions that must be
satisﬁed at a CPO and to show how these end up being achieved at an RCPP equilibrium through
the eﬀect of the perception functions ˜ Q.
First-order Conditions. Let (x,y,e,κ,θ,ξ) be a CPO allocation such that: (i) the striking
prices are strictly between the values Fi
s(κi,e i),s ∈S , so that the payoﬀs Ri
j(yi) of the options
are locally diﬀerentiable; (ii) each agent’s consumption vector xi is strictly positive; (iii) each
entrepreneur i’s eﬀort level ei is a locally diﬀerentiable selection of the eﬀort correspondence ˜ ei,
which with a slight abuse of notation we denote by ˜ ei(mi,κ i,θi
i,ξi
i). This CPO allocation is an








subject to the constraints (i)-(vii) in Deﬁnition 4, for some vector of relative weights ν ∈ |RI
+, ν  = 0.
It must therefore satisfy the FOCfor this constrained maximum problem. To express the cost of
each constraint in units of date 0 consumption, we divide all the multipliers by the multiplier
induced by the resource availability constraint (iv) at date 0. Let (q0,qk
y,qk
c,1,πi,µi,  i)d e n o t e
the resulting normalized multipliers associated with the constraints (i)-(vii). For each s ∈Sand
i ∈I ,l e tJ i
s ⊂J i denote the subset of options which are “in the money” at the CPO in state
s, i.e. j ∈J i
s implies Fi
s(κi,e i) >τ i
j. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the variables















































∂ei −  i (6)
19µi
s = πi











































































































where we have divided both sides by ui 
0. (14) is just the marginal way of expressing the incentive


























∂κi = 0 which implies  i =0a n dµi
s = πi
s.
Economic Interpretation of FOC. Equation (5) deﬁnes the present-value vector πi =( πi
1,...,πi
S)
of agent i: for any date 1 income stream v =( v1,...,v S), πi v is the present value to agent i of
t h ei n c o m es t r e a mv (i.e. what he is prepared to pay for it at date 0). The components of the
vector q =( q0,qk
y,qk
c,k∈I) are the shadow prices of the securities i.e. the social gain from giving
one (marginal) unit of the relevant security to any agent in the economy. µi
s is the social gain from
giving one more unit of income to entrepreneur i in state s: in most models this social gain would
coincide with the private gain πi
s, but in this setting, giving more income to entrepreneur i inﬂuences
his eﬀort, and thus has a consequence on other agents (equity or option holders of ﬁrm i), which
20creates a discrepancy between social and private beneﬁt.  i is the social value of an additional unit
of eﬀort by entrepreneur i;b y( 6 ) i is the diﬀerence between the social marginal beneﬁt — namely
the (marginal) beneﬁt to entrepreneur i plus the beneﬁt to every “outside investor” holding either
the equity or options of ﬁrm i — and the social marginal cost, which here coincides with the private
cost ci /ui 
0, since entrepreneur i is the only one to bear the cost of his eﬀort. Since eﬀort is chosen
optimally by entrepreneur i, by the “envelope theorem”, or more precisely by the FOC(14), the
welfare eﬀect on the entrepreneur of a marginal change in his eﬀort is zero. This explains why (6)
and (14) lead to (15), namely that the social value of an additional unit of eﬀort by entrepreneur i
is the value to agents other than himself of the additional output that his eﬀort would create.12 As
soon as θk
i  =0o rξk
i  =0f o rs o m ek  = i, a marginal increment of eﬀort by agent i has an external
eﬀect on agent k which is not taken into account when entrepreneur i makes his eﬀort decision.
 i, which is the cost of the incentive constraint (vii), is the sum of these external eﬀects, and is in
essence the cost of separating the ownership and control of ﬁrm i. This cost is explicitly taken into
account by the planner when he chooses the ﬁnancial variables (κ,θ,ξ). Equations (8)-(13), i.e.
the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the ﬁnancial variables (ξ,θ), express the limited sense in
which there must be equalization of marginal rates of substitution to achieve a CPO allocation,
full equalization (in the general case) being prevented by the fact that income can only be distrib-
uted indirectly using securities, and that the incentive constraints of the agents must be satisﬁed.
Equations (8)-(13) require that the social marginal cost of each security equal its social marginal
beneﬁt, the latter being a sum of two terms, one direct the other indirect: the direct eﬀect is the
private beneﬁt to an agent of the security’s income stream, and the indirect eﬀect is the social cost
of the reduced eﬀort made by agent i as a result of this increment to his income stream. For the
outside variables (ξ0,ξi
k,j,θi
k) the indirect eﬀect is taken into account by µi
s,f o rt h ei n s i d ev a r i a b l e s
(ξi
i,j,θi
i) it depends on the speciﬁc way in which the variable aﬀects the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. The
FOC(8) for the capital stock κi of ﬁrm i diﬀers in that an increment to κi aﬀects all agents holding
one of the securities of ﬁrm i.13
12Note that the beneﬁt to these agents k  = i is evaluated usingµ
k
s rather than π
k
s and thus when k is an entrepreneur
incorporates the incentive cost of giving him a marginal increment of income in state s.
















































i. The left side is the social marginal cost of capital, which, given the
normalization, is 1. The right side is the net marginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of capital: its ﬁrst term is
the direct marginal beneﬁt to all agents holding securities of ﬁrm i from the increased output. The last two terms
are the indirect eﬀects: for entrepreneur i changing κ
i aﬀects the marginal product of his eﬀort by ∂˜ e
i/∂κ
i,w h i c h
21How the FOC for CPO are Achieved at Equilibrium. Since an RCPP equilibrium is
constrained Pareto optimal, in such an equilibrium entrepreneurs must — just like the planner in
a CPO problem — be induced to take into account the external eﬀect of their eﬀort on the welfare
of others, namely the terms involving  i in equations (5)-(13). How is this eﬀect transmitted to
entrepreneurs?
The ﬁrst point to note is that entrepreneur i raises money by selling a share (1 − θi
i)o fh i s
equity and is thus concerned with the valuation qi
y = ¯ πy i that investors will assign to his ﬁrm.
The assumption of competition implies that he doesn’t perceive any eﬀect of his actions on the
vector of state prices ¯ π; the assumption of rationality implies that he perceives that the output yi
that investors anticipate from his ﬁrm is inﬂuenced by his choice of ﬁnancial variables. Actually
since the entrepreneur can typically raise the value of his equity by holding options—to convince







i,j, and it is this net value which is of concern to entrepreneur i.W h e n
he considers alternative ﬁnancing decisions, he knows that investors will anticipate the output
yi = F i(κi, ˜ ei(κi,θi,ξi)) and that this anticipation on their part will translate into the net proceeds
for him ¯ πyi(1 − θi
i) − ¯ πRi(yi)ξi
i at date 0. It is his concern for the value of the equity that he
sells, net of the cost of options, which leads the entrepreneur to take into account the interests
of outside investors when he chooses his ﬁnancial variables (κi,θi,ξi). The exact mechanism by
which entrepreneur’s internalize the external eﬀect of their eﬀort on other investors can best be
seen by studying the ﬁrst order conditions for each entrepreneur’s maximum problem in an RCPP
equilibrium and comparing them with the FOC for a CPO allocation. Consider the maximum
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has the social beneﬁt  
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where α is an index denoting any one of the traded securities [α = 0 (bond) or α = k (equity
of ﬁrm k)o rα =( k,j) (option j of ﬁrm k)], vα ∈ |RS is its dividend stream, and zi
α is the
appropriate component of agent i’s portfolio zi =( θi,ξi). By paying attention to the way investors








, entrepreneur i is led to take their interests into account. With the rational,
competitive price perceptions ˜ Q
i





































































































where β is an index denoting one of the securities associated with ﬁrm i (β = y or β = j, j ∈Ji),
whose price is inﬂuenced by the action of entrepreneur i,a n dSi
β is the subset of states in which
security (i,β) has a positive payoﬀ: thus Si
β = S if β = y and Si
β = Si
j = {s ∈S|Fi
s(¯ κi, ¯ ei) >τ i
j}
if β = j, j ∈Ji.
For i ∈I, deﬁne




















s  =¯ πi
s  +  i ∂˜ ei
∂mi
s 
,s   ∈S (26)
23Substituting (21) and (22) into equation (19) for a security α whose payoﬀ is not directly inﬂuenced
by the eﬀort of agent i (α =( k,β)w i t hk  = i, β = y or β = j,j ∈Jk) and using the expressions








so that each agent equalizes the price of a security which inﬂuences his outside income with its
present value under the modiﬁed present-value vector (26). Thus for an agent k  = i and a security
for ﬁrm i (α =( i,β))











where the second equality follows from the deﬁnition of ¯ π. Thus the valuations under the vectors
¯ π and ¯ µk agree on the subspace V−k(¯ y). A marginal change ∆κi in the input, or ∆ei in the eﬀort







∂ei ∆ei in output in each state: this induces
a change ∆yi in the payoﬀ of equity and a change ∆Ri











∂ei ∆ei, if s ∈S i
j
0i fs/ ∈S i
j
By SPS the changes ∆yi and ∆Ri































where we recall that Si
β = S when β = y.S i n c e


























































which is the same as (15). Substituting (20)-(24) into (17)-(19), using (28) and (30), gives the FOC
(6)-(13) for a CPO.
24It is interesting to note that when  i is deﬁned by (25), and price perceptions satisfy (20)-(24),
then for any change dzi






y(1 − ¯ θi






=  i ∂˜ ei
∂zi
α
Thus in an RCPP equilibrium an entrepreneur acting purely in his own self interest is made aware
of the value of his eﬀort ( i) through the change in the date 0 income earned from the sale of his
equity (net of options), arising from a change ∆ei in the eﬀort that investors expect from him. The
optimality property of an RCPP equilibrium is then explained by equality (30): market clearing
and the common valuation of the traded securities imply that the private value  i of his eﬀort
to entrepreneur i given by (25) coincides with the social value of his eﬀort to investors holding
securities of ﬁrm i, given by the right side of (30). In short, with sophisticated participants,
the security markets ensure that self-interested behavior leads to a (constrained) socially optimal
outcome.
4. RCPP and Pareto Optimality
In the previous section we showed that a ﬁnancial market (RCPP) equilibrium is always con-
strained Pareto optimal, that is, given the constraints imposed by the limited possibilities for risk
sharing and the unobservability of eﬀort of entrepreneurs, the system of markets does as well as a
“benevolent” planner. A more developed capital market in essence means a capital market with a
richer system of derivative securities. Is it possible by adjoining a rich enough system of options on
the underlying equity contracts to achieve a Pareto optimal allocation? In short can the addition
of enough options ensure that the risk-sharing and incentive constraints are not binding? To study
this question recall

























F i(κi,e i) (31)
An allocation (x∗,y∗,κ∗,e∗) is Pareto optimal, if it is feasible and if there does not exist another
feasible allocation (x,y,κ,e) such that Ui(xi,e i) ≥ Ui(xi∗,e i∗), ∀ i ∈I , with strict inequality
for at least one i.
If ﬁnancial contracts could be written contingent on the states of nature, so that they have
payoﬀs independent of the agents’ actions, and if such contracts were complete — in short, if there
25were a complete set of Arrow securities — then there would be a simple way of obtaining a Pareto
optimal allocation, despite the non-observability of eﬀort. It would suﬃce to let each entrepreneur
be the sole proprietor of his ﬁrm so that he has both the full marginal beneﬁt and cost of his eﬀort
and there is no distortion of incentives. It is useful to make this statement precise by introducing the
concept of a sole-proprietorship equilibrium with Arrow securities, or equivalently with contingent
markets, since it serves as the reference concept for studying when contracts based on observable
outputs of the ﬁrms can lead to Pareto optimality. Letting the price of income at date 0 be
normalized to 1 and letting πs denote the price (at date 0) of the Arrow security for state s (which
delivers one unit of income in state s ∈S ), the budget set of agent i with Arrow securities and sole






(xi,e i) ∈ |RS+2
+





   
xi
0 = ωi
0 − πζi − κi
xi
1 = ζi + F i(κi,e i)




where π =( π1,...,π S)a n dζi =( ζi
1,...,ζi
S) is agent i’ portfolio of the Arrow securities. As usual,
the S + 1 budget constraints with Arrow securities can be reduced to a single budget constraint,
i.e. the set B(π,ωi








0 + πFi(κi,e i) − κi
 
(32)
This is the budget set of an agent with contingent markets for income and sole proprietorship.
Deﬁnition 6. (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e; ¯ π)i sa sole-proprietorship equilibrium with contingent markets (SPCM)
if





 (xi,e i) ∈ B(¯ π,ωi
0,F i)
 














i∈I F i(κi,e i)
An SPCM is not precisely an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, since there are S +1+I1 “goods” in
the economy — the S + 1 incomes at dates 0 and 1, and the I1 eﬀort levels of the entrepreneurs
— but there are only S + 1 markets. Despite the absence of the I1 markets for the eﬀort levels of
entrepreneurs, the ﬁrst and second welfare theorems — as well as the existence of equilibrium —
are satisﬁed by SPCM equilibria. This is due to the following two properties of “Robinson Crusoe”
economies:
(i) An agent who is both a producer and a consumer in a convex economy can be split into two
“personalities”: an entrepreneur who maximizes proﬁt and a consumer who takes the proﬁt as
26given and maximizes utility over his budget set (see Magill-Quinzii (1996a) for an account of this
property in a general framework).
(ii) Agent i as the entrepreneur running ﬁrm i buys the input “eﬀort for ﬁrm i” from only one
agent, himself as a consumer. The market for eﬀort ei can thus be “internalized” in the joint
consumer-producer maximum problem of agent i in a SPCM. Any other ownership structure of the
ﬁrm would fail to lead to Pareto optimality in the absence of a market for eﬀort
Proposition 2. (Properties of SPCM equilibrium)
(i) For any ω0 ∈ |RI
+,ω 0  =0 , there exists an SPCM equilibrium.
(ii) If (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e; ¯ π) is an SPCM equilibrium, then the allocation (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e) is Pareto optimal.
(iii) For any Pareto optimal allocation (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e) there exist incomes ω0 ∈ |RI and state prices
¯ π ∈ |RS
++ such that (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e; ¯ π) is an SPCM equilibrium.
Proof. The existence proof is standard. To prove the equivalence between PO allocations and
SPCM equilibria in the diﬀerentiable case it suﬃces to note that the FOC for Pareto optimality





















∂κi (¯ κi, ¯ ei),i ∈I
In both cases the problems are convex so that the FOCare necessary and suﬃcient. Diﬀerentiability
assumptions are not required for the results of Proposition 2. We leave it to the reader to adapt
the standard arguments in the non-diﬀerentiable case.  
If an RCPP equilibrium is to lead to a Pareto optimum, then the equilibrium needs to mimick
an SPCM equilibrium: to this end it is useful to write the budget set of an RCPP equilibrium in
a form that brings it closer to the SPCM budget set. This can be done in two steps as follows.
Incorporating Deﬁnition 3(ii) of price perceptions directly into agent i’s date 0 budget equation (in
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0 + vq(mi)+πF(κi,e i)(1 − θi
i) − πRi(κi,e i)ξi
i − κi
xi
1 = mi + F i(κi,e i)θi
i + Ri(κi,e i)ξi
i





i,κ i) ∈ |R × |RJi
× |R+

       
       
(33)
27where π ∈ |RS
++ satisﬁes the no-arbitrage condition πV (y)=q. Note that if we multiply the date
1 budget equation for state s by πs and add, we obtain πxi
1, namely the present value of agent i’s
date 1 consumption stream: since by no-arbitrage πmi = vq(mi), adding the present value of the
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0 + πFi(κi,e i) − κi
xi
1 = mi + F i(κi,e i)θi
i + Ri(κi,e i)ξi
i





i,κ i) ∈ |R × |RJi
× |R+

       
       
(34)
in which the date 0 equation is the budget equation of an SPCM equilibrium. If the budget set
B(π) in (34) is to reduce to the budget set B(π) in (32), then neither the date 1 equations nor
the eﬀort constraint ei ∈ ˜ ei must be binding. Since the date 1 constraints can be written as
xi
1 ∈V −i(y)+Vi(κi,e i), these constraints are not binding if V−i(y)+Vi(κi,e i)=|RS for the
relevant choices of (κi,e i). Up to non-convexities, the constraint ei ∈ ˜ ei will not be binding if the
cost  i of the constraint that eﬀort is optimal for entrepreneur i after the ﬁnancial variables are



















that is, if the combined holdings of equity and options of his own ﬁrm are such that entrepreneur
i receives the full value of the marginal product of his eﬀort, as in an SPCM equilibrium. The
diﬀerence between an RCPP and an SPCM equilibrium is that in the system with equity and
options, an entrepreneur can receive the full value of the marginal product of his eﬀort without
appropriating the full value of the output of his ﬁrm as in an SPCM equilibrium.
If options can serve to complete the markets and to provide entrepreneurs with the appropriate
incentives, they do however introduce a technical diﬃculty into the analysis: because of their non-
linear payoﬀs, the problem (E) of optimal eﬀort of an entrepreneur is non-convex, so that the FOC
for optimal eﬀort is not equivalent to ei ∈ ˜ ei(mi,θi
i,ξi
i). To be able to relate RCPP equilibria to
SPCM equilibria, we begin by weakening the concept of an RCPP equilibrium to a weak-RCPP
equilibrium in which the optimal-eﬀort condition ei ∈ ˜ ei is replaced by the requirement ei satisﬁes







i,y). A reader familiar with Theory of Incomplete Markets (Magill-Quinzii
(1996a), section 10) will note that the budget set B(π) written in terms of the vector of state prices π,i st h e
equivalent for this model of the budget set of an agent in a no-arbitrage equilibrium.
28equilibrium and a “true” RCPP equilibrium. For the analysis that follows it will be more convenient
to use the form (34) rather than (33) for an agent’s budget set and to deﬁne the equilibrium in
terms of state prices π: the standard concept expressed in terms of security prices can be recovered
from the formula ¯ q = ¯ πV (¯ y).
Deﬁnition 7. (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e, ¯ θ,¯ ξ; ¯ π)i saweak-RCPP equilibrium if
(i) for each agent i ∈I, the action (¯ xi, ¯ ei, ¯ κi, ¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i) maximizes Ui(xi,e i) over the budget set
B (π,ωi
0,F i, ¯ y)=

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(xi,e i) ∈ |RS+2
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(κi,θi,ξi) ∈ |R+ × |RI1 × |RJ

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(36)




k =1 ,k∈I 1 (iv)
 
i∈I ¯ ξi
0 =0 ( v )
 
i∈I ξi
k = 0,k ∈I 1
The possibility of making the FOCfor optimal eﬀort into non-binding constraints comes from
the following property of options: if the subspace Vi(¯ yi) spanned by ﬁrm i’s securities is of maximum
possible dimension given the vector of outputs ¯ yi, i.e. if there are options with striking prices lying
between the distinct values of output across the states, then 1 ∈V i(¯ yi). For example, suppose
that there are 4 states, that ¯ yi = F i(¯ κi, ¯ ei)=( a,b,b,c)w i t ha>b>c>0 and that there are two








aa − τ1 a − τ2
b 0 b − τ2








The columns of the matrix are linearly independent and generate the subspace Vi(¯ yi)={v ∈ |R4 |
v2 = v3} which contains 1. Because of this redundancy, any vector v ∈V i(¯ yi) can be written in
many diﬀerent ways as
v = λ01 + λ1F i(¯ κi, ¯ ei)+µ1Ri
1(¯ κi, ¯ ei)+µ2Ri
2(¯ κi, ¯ ei)
If v is an income stream received by entrepreneur i, then the choice of (λ,µ) which is irrelevant
when (¯ κi, ¯ ei) are ﬁxed, i.e. from the spanning point of view, is important when they are varied, i.e.
29in deciding whether (¯ κi, ¯ ei)i so p t i m a l :λ0 determines the outside income independent of agent i’s
eﬀort, while (λ1,µ 1,µ 2) directly aﬀect the marginal beneﬁt accruing from one more unit of eﬀort.
Deﬁnition 8. We say that there is complete spanning with redundancy (CSR) at ¯ y if
(i) V(¯ y)=|RS (complete markets)
(ii) 1 ∈V i(¯ y), ∀ i ∈I 1 (redundancy).
Proposition 3. (SPCM implies weak-RCPP) Let (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e; ¯ π) be an SPCM equilibrium. If
the security structure of the economy E(U,ω0,F,τ) is such that CSR is satisﬁed at ¯ y, then there
exist portfolios (¯ θ,¯ ξ) such that (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e, ¯ θ,¯ ξ; ¯ π) is a weak-RCPP equilibrium.
Proof. It is clear that for an entrepreneur i ∈I 1 the budget set (36) is contained in the SPCM
budget set i.e. B (¯ π,ωi
0,F i, ¯ y) ⊂ B(¯ π,ωi
0,F i), while for an investor i ∈I 2 the two budget sets
concide, since for i ∈I 2, V−i(¯ y)=V(¯ y)=|RS. Suppose for the moment that we can show that
the optimal choice (¯ xi, ¯ κi, ¯ ei) of each entrepreneur i ∈I 1 in the larger budget set B can also be
obtained in B  with a portfolio (¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i): then clearly (¯ xi,¯ κi, ¯ ei, ¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i) is optimal in B . The proof
of Proposition 3 can then be completed by the following argument. Choose one investor and call
him agent I: such an investor exists since I2  = ∅. For each of the other investors i ∈I 2,i  = I
choose a portfolio (¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i) such that ¯ xi
1 = V (¯ y)(¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i)T: such a portfolio exists since the markets














This ensures that the market clearing equations hold for the securities. Since for all i  = I, ¯ xi
1 =
V (¯ y)(¯ θ
i,¯ ξ














i =I ¯ xi
1.
By the date 1 market clearing equations in an SPCM, ¯ xI
1 = V (¯ y)(¯ θ
I,¯ ξ
I)T.S i n c e t h e d a t e 0
constraint in B  is the same as the budget constraint in B, for each investor ¯ xi ∈B   and is thus
optimal in this set.
It only remains to prove that for each entrepreneur i ∈I 1 there exists a portfolio (¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i)s u c h
that (¯ xi, ¯ ei;¯ κi, ¯ θ
i,ξi) lies in the budget set B .S i n c e V(¯ y)=V−i(¯ y)+Vi(¯ y)=|RS,t h e r ee x i s t
˜ mi ∈V −i(¯ y)a n d( ˜ θi
i,˜ ξ
i
i) such that ¯ xi
1 = ˜ mi + ¯ yi˜ θi
i + ¯ R
i˜ ξi










j. Thus for any γ ∈ |R
¯ xi
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i,j + γαi
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∂ei (¯ κi, ¯ ei)  = 0. This condition is
generic since it is possible to perturb one coeﬃcient αi
j by perturbing the striking price of the option
with the highest striking price which is in the money at ¯ yi.15 Let ¯ mi = ˜ mi − ¯ γ1, ¯ θi




ij = ˜ ξi
ij + αi
j¯ γ,a n dl e t( ¯ θi
k,¯ ξ
i
k)k =i be such that ¯ mi =
 




k), then (¯ xi, ¯ ei;¯ κi, ¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i) ∈
B .  
Given the way that we have set up the model, the assumption CSR requires that markets can
be completed using only options on individual ﬁrms’ equity (so-called simple options) and this
restricts the stochastic structure of ﬁrms’ production functions. As Ross (1976) has pointed out in
some cases it may be necessary to introduce complex options to complete the markets — a complex
option being an option based on the payoﬀ of a portfolio of equity contracts—such as an option on
the S&P500 or the Dow Jones index (see Example 3 below).
Introducting complex options into the model would not in any essential way change the analysis
and would only require additional notation—which is the reason for their omission.16 The condition
CSR can always be satisﬁed by having a complete set of simple options on each ﬁrm and appropriate
complex options to complete the markets.17
Example 3. To illustrate the conditions involved in CSR suppose that there are 4 states and 3
ﬁrms and that ﬁrms’ production functions have the following properties. Firm 1 is such that for all




4, while ﬁrm 2 is such that for all (κ2,e 2)   0




4. This suggests a state space S = {α,β}×{ γ,δ},i n
which (α,β) are the good and bad states for ﬁrm 1, while (γ,δ) are the good and bad states for
15We do not make a generic statement in the Proposition since the striking price of an option is easily changed and
the genericity is rather trivial.
16Complex options, which serve only a spanning role in the two-period model, are likely to have a more important
role in a multiperiod model: for in such a setting, the payoﬀ of a ﬁrm’s option depends on the price of its equity
instead of depending directly on its realized proﬁt as in the two-period model. Complex options can help discriminate
betwen the performance of a ﬁrm and the general state of the market, both of which aﬀect its equity price.
17Ross (1976) has shown that markets can be completed by using only a family of complex options (i.e. with
diﬀerent striking prices) on a single portfolio of the equity contracts. He argued that it would be simpler to have
options on such a single portoﬂio rather than the proliferation of simple options which is observed in US markets.
The present analysis shows however that simple options play a role both for risk sharing and incentives and hence
cannot readily be replaced by complex options on a single portfolio of equity contracts.
31ﬁrm 2. Suppose ﬁrm 3 does well when ﬁrms 1 and 2 are in their good states, badly when they
are both in their bad states, and has a “medium” proﬁt otherwise, i.e. for all (κ3,e 3)   0a n d




4.L e t( ¯ yi, ¯ κi, ¯ ei),i =1 ,2,3 be the production part of a Pareto
optimal allocation with ¯ y   0. If there is one option for ﬁrm 1 with striking price τ1 such that
¯ y1
H >τ 1 > ¯ y1






4), one option for ﬁrm 2 with striking price τ2
such that ¯ y2
H >τ 2 > ¯ y2
L (with obvious notation) and 2 options for ﬁrm 3 with striking prices τ3
1
and τ3
2 such that ¯ y3
H >τ 3
1 > ¯ y3
M >τ 3
2 > ¯ y3
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The securities of ﬁrm 1 span the 2-dimensional subspace V1(¯ y)={v ∈ |R4 | v1 = v2,v 3 = v4},
the securities for ﬁrm 2 span the 2-dimensional subspace V2(¯ y)={v ∈ |R4 | v1 = v3,v 2 = v4} and
the securities of ﬁrm 3 span the 3-dimensional subspace V3(¯ y)={v ∈ |R4 | v2 = v3}.E a c ho ft h e s e
subspaces contains 1 and V0 + V1(¯ y)+V2(¯ y)+V3(¯ y)=|R4 so that CSR is satisﬁed. However
V0 + V1(¯ y)+V2(¯ y) is of dimension 3 (since V0 ⊂V 1(¯ y)a n dV0 ⊂V 2(¯ y)): thus if ﬁrms 1 and 2
were the only ﬁrms, then simple options would not complete the markets. A complex option on









L) would complete the markets.
To use Proposition 3 to derive an existence theorem for weak-RCPP equilibria, we need to
give suﬃcient conditions ensuring that CSR is satisﬁed at any SPCM equilibrium. To have the
redundancy condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 8 satisﬁed it suﬃces to have the maximum number of
linearly independent options on each ﬁrm. By Ross (1976), the complete markets condition (i) will
be satisﬁed at ¯ y (by introducing complex options if necessary) if ¯ y distinguishes between the states,
i.e. for each pair of states s and s  there is at least one ﬁrm for which ¯ yi
s  =¯ yi
s . This leads to the
following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 9. We say that the state space S is technological if for any pair of states s and s  in S,
there exists a ﬁrm i ∈I 1 and inputs (κi,e i) such that Fi
s(κi,e i)  = Fi
s (κi,e i).
Deﬁnition 10. We say that the technology of ﬁrm i has the no-crossing property if Fi
s(κi,e i)  =
Fi
s (κi,e i) for some input pair (κi,e i) implies that this property is satisﬁed for all (κi,e i)   0.
32Since we have assumed that ﬁrms are suﬃciently productive to be active in any equilibrium,
the combination of a technological state space and the no-crossing property imply that at any
SPCM equilibrium ¯ y distinguishes between states. The no-crossing property is strong and could
be weakened to the existence of only isolated crossing points at the cost of introducing generic
arguments. The following result follows readily from Proposition 2(i) and 3.
Corollary 4. (Existence of weak-RCPP equilibrium) If the state space is technological and
the ﬁrms’ technologies satisfy the no-crossing property, then for any ω0 ∈ |RI
+,ω0  =0there is a
security structure such that there exists a weak-RCPP equilibrium which is Pareto optimal for the
economy E(U,ω0,F,τ) .
In order to obtain the stronger result that any weak-RCPP equilibrium is Pareto optimal,
stronger assumptions must be made to prevent a weak-RCPP equilibrium from getting “stuck” at
an ineﬃcient allocation because entrepreneurs cannot use options other than those currently active
at the equilibrium. Thus the set J i of potentially traded options must be suﬃciently rich, even
though typically at a given equilibrium only a few of these options will be actively traded: most
will either be “out of the money” or duplicating existing traded options. The existence of many
such potentially active options ensures that in a weak-RCPP equilibrium an entrepreneur can draw
on a suﬃciently rich set of ﬁnancial strategies to be able to duplicate any of the “relevant” choices
in the SPCM budget set B(¯ π,ωi
0,F i). To deﬁne what we mean by the “relevant choices”, note that
in an equilibrium with complete markets (whether it be an SPCM or a weak-RCPP equilibrium),
every investor is subject to a standard Arrow-Debreu budget constraint. Since the economy has
bounded resources and investors have monotonic preferences, any candidate equilibrium vector of
state prices must be bounded away from zero. In short, for a given economy, there exists  >0
such that any equilibrium price vector of an SPCM equilibrium or a weak-RCPP equilibrium with
complete markets satisﬁes π ≥  1.
Deﬁnition 11. Ap l a n( xi,κ i,e i)i ss a i dt ob eundominated for agent i if there exists a vector
of state prices π ≥  1, such that (xi,κ i,e i) is optimal in B(π,ωi
0,F i). An input pair (κi,e i)i s
undominated, if it is part of an undominated plan (xi,κ i,e i).
Deﬁnition 12. We say that there is complete spanning with redundancy at all undominated input
pairs(CSRU) if there exist subspaces V1,...,VI1 such that
(i) V0 + V1 + ...+ VI1 = |RS
33(ii) 1 ∈V i, for all i ∈I 1
(iii) Vi(κi,e i) ⊂ V i, for all (κi,e i) ⊂ |R2
+
(iv) Vi(κi,e i)=Vi, for all undominated (κi,e i)
The property CSRU is satisﬁed if the ﬁrms’ technologies have the no-crossing property and the
minimum of the diﬀerences between production levels across the states for all undominated input




s(κi,e i) − Fi
s (κi,e i)|
   
 (κi,e i) undominated and (s,s ) such that Fi




If for each ﬁrm i the set of striking prices τi =( τi
j)j∈Ji, contains all multiples of αi as potential
striking prices, then CSRU is satisﬁed.
Proposition 5. (Weak-RCPP is Pareto optimal) Let E(U,ω0,F,τ) be an economy satisfying
CSRU. If (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e, ¯ θ,¯ ξ; ¯ π) is a weak-RCPP equilibrium at which markets are complete, then
(¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e; ¯ π) is an SPCM equillibrium and the allocation (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e) is Pareto optimal.
Proof. In order to prove that (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ κ,¯ e; ¯ π) is an SPCM equilibrium, it suﬃces to prove that
for each entrepreneur (¯ xi, ¯ κi, ¯ ei) is optimal in B(¯ π,ωi
0,F i). Since (¯ x, ¯ κi, ¯ ei, ¯ θ
i,¯ ξ
i) is optimal in
B (¯ π,ωi
0,F i, ¯ y), it suﬃces to prove that the optimal choice (xi,κ i,e i) of agent i in B(¯ π,ωi
0,Fi)c a n
be obtained with ﬁnancial variables (θi,ξi)i nB (¯ π,ωi
0,F i, ¯ y). Using CSRU this can be shown by
an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 3.  
Thus, under the assumption that options are brought into the market when they are needed,
weak-RCPP equilibria are Pareto optimal. What remains to be studied is when a weak-RCPP is an
RCPP equilibrium, i.e. when the ﬁrst-order approach gives a correct result. This happens when the
eﬀort level satisfying the ﬁrst-order conditions for problem (E) which maximizes the overall utility
of entrepreneur i in the budget set (36) is also the solution to problem (E), i.e. maximizes the date
1 utility of the entrepreneur, net of the cost of eﬀort, once the ﬁnancial variables are ﬁxed. We have
examined a large family of economies satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 4, and in each case
we found that there is a proﬁle of striking prices (typically many proﬁles) for the options for which
the weak-RCPP equilibrium is an RCPP equilibrium: there are also proﬁles for which weak-RCPP
are not RCPP equilibria. The example that follows is typical and illustrates the apparent diﬃculty
of establishing a general result due to the inherent non-convexities introduced by options.
Example 4. Consider an economy with two agents, an entrepreneur (agent 1) and an investor




κeη with η =( 2 5 ,23,20)



















s,δ =0 .9,c (ei)=( ei)2
and the initial wealth of each agent is ω1
0 = 30, ω2
0 = 270. When a1 = a2 = 0, the sole-proprietorship






3 ¯ κ ¯ e ¯ y1 ¯ y2 ¯ y3
agent 1 65 124 114 99 112 1.86 360 331 288
agent 2 124 236 331 288
To decentralize this Pareto optimum as a weak-RCPP equilibrium with a market structure con-
sisting of equity with payoﬀ ¯ y, a bond with payoﬀ 1 =( 1 ,1,1) and options with payoﬀs Rj(¯ y)=
max{¯ ys − τj,0}, j ∈J, we need to solve the system of equations
¯ x1





















which admits a solution as soon as there is an option, call it option 1, with a striking price τ1 such
that ¯ y2 <τ 1 < ¯ y1 and an second, option 2, with a striking price τ2 such that ¯ y3 <τ 2 < ¯ y2.F o rm o s t
values of (τ1,τ 2), the solution of the system (37) is such that θ1 > 1a n dξ1
0 is large and negative:
this is more readily interpreted by introducing a third option, option 3, with striking price τ3 < ¯ y3,
which has the same marginal eﬀect as equity but automatically subtracts the income ξ1
3 τ3 from
the income that the entrepreneur receives from the ﬁrm. For each combination τ =( τ1,τ 2,τ 3)o f
the striking prices satisfying the relevant inequalities and any θ,18 there is a solution to the system
of equations (37) which gives the ﬁnancial variables ξ1(τ,θ)=( ξ1
j((τ,θ))j=0,...,3 of a weak RCPP
equilibrium.19 To study if these equilibria are RCPP equilibria, we have computed the maximum
18The notation θ
1 is simpliﬁed to θ. The share of agent is θ
2 =1− θ.
19Since the Pareto optimal allocation can be decentralized as a weak-RCPP equilibrium for any value of θ,a n di n
particular for θ = 0, the results of this section are likely to extend to a more complicated (but also more realistic)
model in which the initial owner of the ﬁrm and the manager are separate agents, as long as the reward schedule











for diﬀerent values of τ,ﬁ x i n gθ at 0.4.20 Many, but not all, values of τ give a maximum at ¯ e.
Some lead to an optimal eﬀort which is smaller and some to an optimal eﬀort which is larger
than ¯ e. Figure 1 illustrates the three cases, and shows the incentive schedule φ(y) (i.e the date 1
consumption of agent 1 as a function of the realized output y ) associated with the corresponding
values of ξ1(τ,θ). As the ﬁgure shows, the function V 1
(τ,θ)(e) is far from being concave and has a
complicated structure because of the changes of regime induced by options entering successively
into the money in the diﬀerent states. Varying the parameters of the model — for example the risk
composition η of the ﬁrm’s output or the parameters a1 and a2 of agents’ risk aversion— leads in
each case to the same conclusion: it is always possible to ﬁnd striking prices which induce a reward
structure such that the entrepreneur chooses the optimal level of eﬀort ¯ e, but not all striking prices
work. If the entrepreneur is risk tolerant or if the technology is not very risky, the reward schedules
which work tend to be increasing; when the investor is risk tolerant and insures the entrepreneur
in the Pareto optimal allocation, the reward schedules have a decreasing portion as in Figure 1c.
It is interesting to note that the entrepreneur can be induced to make the optimal eﬀort even when
the investor is essentially risk neutral and bears all the risks of the economy. For example with






3 ¯ κ ¯ e ¯ y1 ¯ y2 ¯ y3
agent 1 66 67 66 66 96 1.72 322 193 129
agent 2 137 254 127 63
so that the entrepreneur’s consumption is essentially constant across states. Achieving the ﬁrst best
allocation in this case, while impossible in the standard model where eﬀort aﬀects the probability of
the outcomes but the outcomes are ﬁxed21, is possible in the present model where eﬀort inﬂuences
the outcome in each state. A reward schedule which induces the optimal eﬀort of the entrepreneur
in this case is shown in Figure 2.
The family of examples that we have studied is encouraging since it shows that options, which
are now extensively used for incentive contracts of top executives, can lead to an eﬃcient allocation
20We take a grid τ1i =¯ y2 +( i/10)(¯ y1 − ¯ y2), τ2j =¯ y3 +( j/10)(¯ y2 − ¯ y1), τ3k =( k/10)(¯ y3), for i,j,k ∈{ 1,...,9}.
21This is the case most often studied in the principal-agent literature (see e.g. Kreps (1990, Chapter 16) for an
exposition)
36of risk and incentives. But it also shows that the result is sensitive to the exact form of the incentive
package, which makes it hard to obtain general results. At the moment we have not succeeded in
ﬁnding general conditions under which it can be proved that Pareto optimal allocations can be
decentralized as RCPP equilibria, and we leave the question open for future research.
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Figure 1: The date 1 utility of the entrepreneur, net of his cost of effort, as a function of effort for the portfolio of options which solves
               the system (37),  for different combinations of striking prices. In case (a) the optimal effort is at the Pareto optimal level 
               e=1.86 and the weak-RCPP is an RCPP; with the striking prices of case (b) the effort optimal for agent 1 is below the Pareto
               optimal level, above in case (c).V1 x ( )
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Figure 2: A reward schedule which induces the entrepreneur to choose the optimal effort in the case where the investor is risk neutral.References
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